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This paper compares the impact of real shocks on small open economies
operating under two opposite corner solutions: ￿ exible exchange rates and
o¢ cial dollarization. Using an asymmetric two-country model of policy coor-
dination, we show that although a pegged regime like dollarization is an e⁄ec-
tive device to achieve price stability, small open economies might be better o⁄
under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime than under dollarization following any
symmetric or asymmetric real shock. We also consider the claim that many
small economies have only a limited ability to use their own monetary pol-
icy e⁄ectively and contrast the dollarization regime with one in which a small
open economy follows "fear of ￿ oating" practices. In this case, we observe that
unless its size is trivial, maintaining monetary policy sovereignty￿ even if it is
not fully exploited￿ allows the domestic economy to experience lower losses
from stabilization in the face of symmetric shocks. Only when an economy
is negligibly small, are the costs of stabilization following "fear of ￿ oating"
practices the same as those under dollarization.
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11 Introduction
During the 1990s several Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) operating under in-
termediate regimes (i.e. ￿xed but adjustable arrangements) su⁄ered severe crises
following the appearance of speculative attacks. A number of currencies, including
the Mexican peso (in 1994), the East Asian currencies (starting in 1997) and the
Brazilian real (in 1999) experienced considerable capital ￿ ow reversal that produced
an astounding toll on their economies.
These crisis episodes led to the ￿ two-corner solutions￿approach to exchange rate
policy, which suggests that countries should either ￿ oat freely or implement a strong
(non-adjustable) pegged regime in order to avoid credibility problems.1 The logic
for the two-corner solution is that, to prevent speculation, policymakers should give
a clear signal that they will avoid market intervention by allowing their currencies
to ￿ oat freely or by giving up monetary independence altogether.
As the two-corner solutions approach to the exchange rate became more popu-
lar, many small and not-so-small open economies were encouraged to move into the
￿rm-￿x corner under the argument that they had little ability to manage their own
monetary policy. Particularly in Latin America, o¢ cial dollarization suddenly ap-
peared as the ￿rational choice￿ ￿for those small open economies for which, according
to Salvatore (2001), ￿the US is their dominant economic partner and which have a
poor monetary performance, and hence have low economic-policy credibility￿ .2 Fol-
lowing this recommendation, Ecuador (in 2000), El Salvador and Guatemala (both
in 2001) adopted the US dollar as their own currency, aiming to gain credibility, sta-
bilize their economies against high rates of in￿ ation, prevent speculation and avoid
economic crises.3
Except for Panama, which has been dollarized since 1904, those countries or
territories using the dollar or another foreign currency as their own money used to
be insigni￿cantly small in relation with the size of the US economy. In fact, the size
of today￿ s three largest dollarized economies in Latin America, Ecuador (0.37%),
El Salvador (0.24%) and Guatemala (0.46%), is still very small with respect to
the US economy.4 Indeed, these three recently dollarized Latin American countries
match fairly well the description of a good candidate for dollarization presented
by Salvatore (2001). They are not only small but also have strong ties to the US
economy in terms of trade, investment, labour mobility through illegal immigration,
1The alternatives in the ￿xed corner are the full adoption of a foreign currency (i.e. o¢ cial
dollarization), implementing a currency board with full convertibility and joining a monetary
union.
2Although for explanatory purposes we refer to ￿the adoption of a foreign currency as a country￿ s
money￿with the term dollarization, alternative currency substitutions other than the US dollar￿
like, for instance, the adoption of the euro (i.e. euroization) by transition economies￿ present the
same distinctive features as the regime examined here.
3Before these economies adopted the regime, the main costs and bene￿ts of dollarization versus
other regimes were promisingly examined in a number of papers (see, for instance, Alesina and
Barro, 2001; Chang, 2000; Salvatore, 2001; Edwards and Magenzo, 2001; Calvo, 2002).
4Numbers in parentheses refer to the size of these economies￿GDP as a proportion of US GDP.
This proportion is only 0.17% in the case of Panama.
2remittances from that illegal immigration, etc. Moreover, these economies also had
severe credibility problems and presented poor macroeconomic performance at the
time they decided to adopt the US dollar as their own currency (Eichengreen, 2001).
In spite of the support that the regimes in the ￿rm-￿xed corner have received,
not everyone has welcomed the view that a pegged regime, such as dollarization,
is preferable to a ￿ exible one. Particularly since the collapse of Argentina￿ s cur-
rency board in 2002, the long-term stability of strong pegs in Latin America has
been seriously questioned. Critics of dollarization argue that, due to the lack of
an independent monetary policy, the ability of a country to react to asymmetric
shocks is greatly reduced under a dollarized regime. They also claim that this hap-
pens because, in the presence or absence of economic shocks, the US monetary
authority pursues an independent policy, which lacks of any commitment towards
the dollarized economies (Cohen, 2004). Eventually, the inability of policymakers to
accommodate macroeconomic shocks results in additional instability which in the
absence of a lender of last resort can cause the collapse of the regime and of the
economy.
In this chapter we attempt to shed some light on this debate by comparing the
impact of real shocks on small open economies operating under the two opposite
corner solutions: ￿ exible exchange rates and o¢ cial dollarization. We introduce
into the analysis two important features from the de￿nition of a good candidate
for dollarization cited above: (i) the size asymmetries between the follower and the
leader country, and (ii) the extent of economic integration (i.e. openness) of the
follower with respect to the leader. In doing so, we argue that￿ in an open economy
environment￿ size matters for macroeconomic stabilization because it changes the
relative incentives of a country to use its monetary policy to optimally a⁄ect the
exchange rate.
In this analysis, we attempt to di⁄erentiate between economies that su⁄er cred-
ibility problems and those that are capable of eliminating or at least reducing those
problems to reasonable boundaries. We start by analysing the implications of adopt-
ing the two corner regimes on credibility. Using a stylized two-country model of
policy coordination, we show that although a pegged regime like dollarization is an
e⁄ective device to achieve price stability for a small open economy, when discipline
prevails to a certain extent, price stability might be achieved e⁄ectively without
having to give up monetary independence. Following the credibility assessment, we
focus our attention on examining the e⁄ects of adopting a dollarization regime on
macroeconomic stabilization. We ￿rst assess the e⁄ect of stabilization policies ne-
glecting the time inconsistency problems that might arise within each country with
respect to the interaction between the monetary authorities and the private sector.
In this case, we analytically show that not just asymmetric but also symmetric real
shocks result in dissimilar e⁄ects, which impinge more heavily on a small open econ-
omy that opts for dollarization. We ￿nd that by exploiting its enhanced ability to
adjust the real exchange rate, a small open economy may be better o⁄under a ￿ ex-
ible exchange rate regime than under dollarization after a symmetric or asymmetric
shock.
3Following those analytical results, we employ a numerical solution to assess the
impact of real shock in the presence of time inconsistency problems. In this case,
we observe that only when the policymaker of the small economy shows poor disci-
pline in controlling in￿ ation (i.e. by aiming at highly expansionary policies which
seriously compromise price stability), does the ￿ exible regime become more costly
than dollarization in terms of stabilization after a symmetric shock. In the presence
of asymmetric shocks, however, a small economy that adopts the dollar as its own
legal tender is condemned to endure the consequences of the resulting macroeco-
nomic distortions. In this instance, the stabilization cost of giving up monetary
independence under dollarization unambiguously exceeds that of low discipline in
controlling in￿ ation under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime.
After comparing dollarization versus a ￿ exible regime, we assess dollarization
vis-￿-vis a di⁄erent benchmark. Recognizing that many economies have only a
limited ability to use their own monetary policy e⁄ectively, we analyse the case of a
small open economy that conducts monetary policy under what Calvo and Reinhart
(2002) call ￿fear of ￿ oating￿practices. In this situation, we ￿nd that, unless the
size of the small economy is trivial, maintaining monetary sovereignty￿ even if it is
not fully exploited￿ allows a better stabilization of the small economy following a
symmetric shock.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
employed, derives some general reduced forms and describes the timing of events.
Section 3 uses the asymmetric framework presented in Section 2 to analyse the
in￿ ationary bias in the absence of shocks. Section 4 focuses on the analysis of
stabilization polices under a ￿ oating regime and dollarization with and without time
inconsistency problems. Section 5 compares the stabilization e⁄ects of dollarization
against those under ￿fear of ￿ oating￿ practices. Finally, Section 6 presents the
conclusions of this chapter.
2 The model
The literature on policy coordination has analysed monetary policymaking among
interdependent economies under di⁄erent exchange rate arrangements. However,
most of the literature employs frameworks in which countries have the same size
and structure. Since economies adopting a foreign currency (e.g. the dollar or the
euro) as their own legal tender are considerably smaller than the issuer country
(i.e. the US economy or the EU), symmetric models are not adequate to examine a
regime like dollarization.5 As we observe later, due to the di⁄erence in size of the
economies, the incentives, strategies and reactions of the policymakers involved in
di⁄erent regimes are not the same as in a symmetrical set-up.
Taking this issue into consideration, the basic model we employ is based on Can-
zoneri and Henderson (1991) two-country model. Asymmetric features are adopted
5From game theory we know that the size of the players in￿ uences the equilibrium strategies
and economic outcomes of a game.
4from Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998) who have used this model to analyse the optimal
size of a currency union. We adapt and extend those models to consider dollarization
as an alternative exchange rate regime for a small open economy in the presence of
credibility problems and symmetric and asymmetric real shocks.
2.1 General framework
Except for the interest rate, all variables in the model are expressed in natural log-
arithms. Unstarred variables correspond to the domestic small country and starred
variables refer to the large foreign economy. Each country specializes in the pro-
duction of a single tradable good and both goods are imperfect substitutes. The
domestic and foreign aggregate supplies (y and y￿) are increasing functions of the
employment rates (n and n￿) and decreasing functions of a symmetric productivity
disturbance, x:
y = (1 ￿ ￿)n ￿ x; y
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)n
￿ ￿ x (1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the elasticity of
output with respect to employment is the same in both countries.
Total labour demand in both economies is determined by pro￿t maximizing ￿rms
for which labour demand is complete when the marginal productivity of labour is
equal to the real wage:
w ￿ p = ￿￿n ￿ x; w
￿ ￿ p
￿ = ￿￿n
￿ ￿ x (2)
where w and w￿ are the domestic and foreign nominal wage rates and p and p￿ are
the domestic and foreign prices. Equations (1) and (2) are derived from a Cobb￿
Douglas production function with a ￿xed stock of capital normalized to unity (see
Appendix A.1 for details).
Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) are weighted averages of the prices of domestic
and foreign goods. Residents in the domestic country spends a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of
their income on domestic goods and a fraction ￿ on foreign goods. On the other
hand, consumers in the foreign country spend a fraction ￿ of their income on their
own goods and a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) on goods produced by the small country. The
CPIs are then described by
q = (1 ￿ ￿)p + ￿(p
￿ + e) = p + ￿z
q
￿ = ￿p
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(p ￿ e) = p
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)z (3)
where 1
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, q and q￿ denote the domestic and foreign CPIs and e and
z = e + p￿ ￿ p are the nominal and real exchange rates, respectively.
In (3), ￿ is an indicator of the size of the two economies and of their integration
toward each other. Notice that when ￿ = 1
2 both economies are identical. As ￿
rises, the size of the foreign country increases and that of the domestic economy
shrinks. In the extreme case in which ￿ = 1 the domestic country becomes simply a
trivially small open economy. In this scenario the domestic country is so small that
it is unable to a⁄ect the foreign country CPI at all.
5Demand is a⁄ected positively by domestic and foreign output according to the
proportion of income allocated by each country. The marginal propensity to spend
￿ is the same for both goods and in both countries. Residents in the two countries
reduce expenditure by the same amount (0 < v < 1) after an increase in the nominal
interest rate.6 The market equilibrium conditions for the two countries are given by
y = ￿￿z + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)y + ￿￿y
￿ ￿ vr ￿ u
y
￿ = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)z + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)y + ￿￿y
￿ ￿ vr
￿ + u (4)
Clearly, a depreciation of the real exchange rate shifts demand from the foreign to-
ward the domestic economy. Notice that when, for instance, ￿ = 1 (i.e. when the
domestic country becomes a negligible small open economy) the real exchange rate
does not a⁄ect the foreign demand. Finally, the parameter u represents an asym-
metric disturbance that a⁄ects both countries in opposite ways, shifting demand
from the domestic to the foreign country when u > 0.
Assuming constant velocity money demand functions in both countries, the equi-
librium condition in the domestic and foreign money markets are given by




where m and m￿ represent the domestic and foreign nominal money supplies.
A priori, the expected real interest rate in each country is de￿ned as the nominal
interest rate minus the expected rate of change in its consumer price index:






Finally, using the interest parity condition, expected interest rates measured in a
common currency are equal to
i = i
￿ + E(e+1) ￿ e (7)
2.2 Semi-reduced forms
We start by obtaining the semi-reduced forms for employment and in￿ ation em-
ployed later to formulate the loss functions of the policymakers. Combining equa-
tions (1), (2) and (5) we can compute the employment semi-reduced form for the
domestic and the foreign country as




In each country, employment rises with an expansion of their money supplies and
declines with increases in their nominal wage rates. Price reduced forms are obtained
by solving the pro￿t maximizing conditions of the ￿rms in (2) for p and p￿ and then
substituting the employment reduced forms on those expression. Thus, we obtain
p = ￿m + (1 ￿ ￿)w + x; p
￿ = ￿m
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)w
￿ + x (9)
6We assume that agents can borrow in both regions. Thus, due to the identical consumer
patterns across the two countries and perfect capital mobility, interest rates are equalized, r = r￿.
6The price of home-produced goods increases after a monetary expansion, a rise in
the nominal wage rate and following a positive productivity shock.
The real exchange rate reduced form is obtained by subtracting the foreign de-
mand equilibrium condition in (4) from the domestic, substituting the aggregate










Finally, we obtain the in￿ ation semi-reduced forms normalizing q￿1 = 0 and sub-
stituting the prices and real exchange rate reduced forms in (3). These are given
by









￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)w






where ￿ = (1￿￿)￿=￿ and ￿ = (1￿￿)(1￿￿)=￿. The reduced forms in (8) and (11)
are adapted later according to the regime considered and the assumptions we make
regarding the presence of time inconsistency problems.
From (11), notice that when, for instance, the economies contract their money
supplies, they are able to export in￿ ation abroad and promote domestic price sta-
bility. The larger ￿ and ￿ are, the higher the incentives of the economies to export
in￿ ation and the more e⁄ective they become attaining price stability.
2.3 Union and central bank preferences
In each country there is a single trade union that sets the nominal wage rate one
period in advance. Trade unions with full information about the model choose
nominal wages by minimizing the deviations of employment from its full employment













Substituting (8) into (12), minimizing with respect to n and n￿; and taking expec-






Money supplies are the policymakers￿only instrument to stabilize employment and
in￿ ation following a symmetric or asymmetric disturbance. They choose their in-















7where k and k￿ are, respectively, the domestic and foreign targets for employment
and the in￿ ation parameter ￿ = q ￿ q￿1:
In principle, monetary policy is subject to a time inconsistency problem in both
countries whenever k and k￿ are di⁄erent from zero. Essentially, the policymakers￿
losses increase with deviations of employment from their target level and positive
changes in their CPIs. The parameter ￿ re￿ ects the weight that each policymaker
attaches to employment deviations from its target, relative to the in￿ ation deviations
from zero. For simplicity, ￿ is assumed to be the same in both countries.
2.4 Timing of events
As mentioned above, both trade unions set wages one period in advance. They have
full information about the preferences and reaction functions of the policymakers
and take them into account in setting the nominal wage rates. Following the wage
setting process, central banks choose their monetary policy.7
Under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime both central banks decide on their mon-
etary policy simultaneously. They play Nash against each other taking the wage
rate set by the unions as given. On the other hand, under dollarization the small
economy gives up its monetary policy. After the adoption of this regime, the central
bank in the large foreign country chooses the world money supply observing only its
own interests. Any monetary policy implemented by the large country is transferred
to the small country immediately through trade and ￿nancial market transactions.
3 In￿ ationary bias in the absence of shocks
Enhancing credibility is regarded as one of the most important bene￿ts of pegging
the exchange rate to another country￿ s money. In general, higher credibility pro-
vides a smaller in￿ ationary bias, less volatility, lower real interest rates, etc. Before
concentrating our attention on stabilization policies, in this section we employ our
asymmetric model to revise the credibility gains that result from ￿xing the exchange
rate through dollarization.
3.1 Flexible exchange rate regime
The in￿ ation bias under a ￿ exible regime arises from the government incentives to
engineer a surprise monetary expansion to drive employment, n; closer to its target,
k. Assuming that trade unions have perfect foresight, minimizing the loss functions
of each policymaker in (14) with respect to its own money supply, we obtain that the






7In the absence of shocks (i.e. x = 0 and u = 0) policymakers only use their money supply to







Notice that the parameters ￿ and ￿, the incentives to a⁄ect the exchange rate under
￿ exible rates for the domestic and foreign country, are functions of the relative size
of the two economies. In the event that ￿ = 1
2 (i.e. when the domestic and the
foreign economies are symmetric in size) both countries may experience the same
level of in￿ ation because in that case ￿ = ￿: However, if the domestic country￿ s
employment target, k; is higher than that of the foreign country, k￿, the in￿ ation
bias in the domestic country is greater than that in the foreign (￿ > ￿￿). This is a
well-known result in the symmetric set-up (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989).
This result, however, does not hold in our asymmetric framework. Notice that
if 1
2 < ￿ ￿ 1 (i.e. as long as asymmetries in the size of the economies exist), a
real depreciation entails a high in￿ ation cost for the small domestic economy. This
happens because due to its consumption patterns a small open economy faces a
higher exchange rate pass-through (see equation (3)). For a given ￿ this weakens
the small economy policymaker￿ s willingness to engineer surprise in￿ ation through a
monetary expansion and might even result in a smaller in￿ ation bias for the domestic
economy when k is close or equal to k￿.
3.2 Dollarization
The analysis of the in￿ ation bias in this section is equivalent for a traditional ￿xed
exchange rate regime and for dollarization. In a ￿xed exchange rate regime the
domestic country commits to keep the exchange rate unchanged. From equation (10)
this implies that the small economy accommodates any change in m￿ with a similar
change in m: Under dollarization, however, a small open economy makes use of its
international reserves to substitute its currency in circulation with foreign money.
Following this conversion, changes in the money supply of the large country are
transferred to the small country through trade and the ￿nancial system transactions.
Assuming again that trade unions have perfect foresight and utilizing that m =
m￿; the minimization of losses for both policymakers leads to the following in￿ a-













where the superscript d refers to the outcomes under dollarization.
As Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) showed, under a pegged exchange rate regime
the follower country reaches the same level of in￿ ation as the foreign country. Here
we ￿nd that this result is valid regardless of the size of the economy that ￿xes the
exchange rate.
Consequently, for the ￿xed exchange rate regime to be superior to the ￿ exible,
the credibility gap should be higher than the domestic country￿ s incentive to export






For a su¢ ciently high value of k, the domestic country is better o⁄ under dollar-
ization than under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime. However, as the value of ￿
tends to 1; the di⁄erence between the credibility gap and the domestic economy￿ s
incentive to export in￿ ation to the rest of the world narrows. This happens because
the openness of the small country prevents the domestic policymaker from creating
in￿ ation by expanding the domestic money supply. Again, the policymaker knows
that an increase in its money supply would lead to an appreciation of the exchange
rate, which increases the price of foreign goods and signi￿cantly a⁄ects overall price
stability.8
The analysis in this section demonstrates that a pegged regime like dollariza-
tion is an e⁄ective device to achieve price stability for a small open economy with
credibility problems. Indeed, this has been the reason why economies like Ecuador,
Guatemala and El Salvador recently adopted the dollar as their own currency. How-
ever, it also shows that when discipline can be imposed (i.e. when k is close or equal
to k￿), credibility problems can be controlled and price stability might be achieved
e⁄ectively without giving up monetary independence.9
4 Stabilization policies
In this section, we shift our attention to the assessment of stabilization polices.
Because of the di⁄erence that the presence of the in￿ ation bias can make in our
assessment, we examine stabilization policies in two di⁄erent scenarios. First, we
look at stabilization leaving aside time inconsistency problems (i.e. we assume k =
k￿ = 0). This allows us to obtain some analytical conclusions with respect to the
performance of employment, in￿ ation and losses under both regimes when discipline
(through, for instance, granting independence to the central bank) can be achieved.
Thereafter, we employ a numerical solution to combine the presence of shocks and
the in￿ ation bias in the analysis of stabilization polices.
We start by describing the reduced forms and reaction functions of the two pol-
icymakers under the ￿ exible and dollarization regimes. After that, we proceed to
derive the equilibrium outcomes and losses that result from the presence of symmet-
ric and asymmetric shocks.
8Provided ￿ > ￿, it is easy to observe how in￿ ation in the domestic economy can be actually
smaller than in the foreign when the domestic policymaker targets the same employment target as
the foreign (compare (15) and (16) when k = k￿).
9For a review of the policies that some EMEs have employed to regulate their policymakers
under ￿ exible exchange rate regimes (e.g. delegating monetary policy to independent, conservative
central banks and adopting explicit in￿ ation targets) and the e⁄ects of those policies on price
stability, see Mishkin (1999) and Mishkin and Savastano (2002).
104.1 Reduced forms and reaction functions
Flexible regime The general reduced forms presented in Section 2 are completed
by de￿ning the way in which wages are set by unions and ￿rms. Assuming perfect
foresight, trade unions that minimize the expected square deviations of employment
from their full employment value of zero use all the information they have to set
wages accordingly (i.e. w = me = ￿
￿+￿k and w￿ = m￿e = ￿
￿+￿k￿). Following this
assumption, using (8) and (11) the employment and in￿ ation reduced forms under
the ￿ exible exchange rate regime are simply given by










￿ = ￿m + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿












￿ + x ￿ ￿(m ￿
￿
￿
k) ￿ ￿u (21)
where ￿ = ￿ + ￿, ￿ = ￿ + ￿, ￿ = 2￿=￿ and ￿ = 2(1 ￿ ￿)=￿:
Employing these reduced forms, each policymaker minimizes his/her loss function
in (14) with respect to his/her own money supply taking as given the money supply
of the other policymaker. Solving the two resulting ￿rst-order conditions for m and











































Each policymaker raises his/her money supply in response to a monetary expan-
sion by his/her counterpart and to achieve its own employment target. Meanwhile,
they contract their money supply in response to the symmetric shock, x, and the
employment target of their neighbour. Finally, the domestic policymaker decreases
its money supply as a result of the demand shock, u, while the foreign policymaker
increases it.
Dollarization A small economy that chooses to adopt the dollar as its own cur-
rency relinquishes the control of its monetary policy to the central bank that issues
the foreign currency. Thereafter, the foreign policymaker has full command over the
world money supply. As a result, changes in the money supply in the small home
economy are the same as in the foreign economy (i.e. m = m￿).
Assuming perfect foresight, now both trade unions set wages according to their
expectations regarding the monetary policy decision of the foreign central bank
(i.e. w = w￿ = m￿e = ￿
￿k￿). Following this assumption, using (8) and (11), the


















￿ + x + ￿u
￿
￿ = ￿m




￿ + x ￿ ￿u (24)
The only di⁄erence between the reduced forms of the two economies resides in the
way that asymmetric shocks a⁄ect them through the real exchange rate. Just as with
the ￿ exible regime, the demand shock increases in￿ ation in the domestic economy
and produces de￿ ationary pressure on the foreign.
Since dollarization is a unilateral strategy, the foreign country policymaker does
not internalize the preferences of the small economy. Instead, he reacts exclusively
to the factors that a⁄ect his own macroeconomic environment. This implies that
the large economy behaves to some extent as a closed economy and the role of the
small economy is reduced to the one played by a small region inside the large foreign
country.
Minimizing the loss function of the foreign economy policymaker in (14) using the














Under dollarization, the foreign economy engineers a monetary contraction in re-
sponse to the symmetric shock, x; and an expansion in response to the asymmetric
shock, u. It also raises the money supply to achieve its employment target, k￿:
4.2 Stabilization without time inconsistency problems
In order to focus our attention on the role of strategic interactions between the two
economies and in the importance of size asymmetries in the choice of a particular
exchange rate regime, in this section we assume that the policymakers￿preferences
are identical and free from time inconsistency problems (i.e. we assume that k￿ =
k = 0). Neglecting time inconsistency problems allows us to obtain analytical results
with respect to the stabilization properties of small open economies in the presence
of symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
Notice that because the numerical solutions that we employ later include the
in￿ ation bias and the shocks, the equilibrium levels of employment, in￿ ation and
losses presented in this section contain the employment targets (i.e. k￿ and k). How-
ever, in order to obtain analytical solutions, both employment targets are assumed
to be equal to zero.
4.2.1 Symmetric shocks
In the general framework of our model, symmetric disturbances are represented by
a negative productivity shock x, which a⁄ects both economies in the same fashion.
This symmetric disturbance gives rise to a stabilization game between the domestic
and foreign policymakers. Following the symmetric shock, both policymakers have
an incentive to contract their money supply to ￿ght in￿ ation; a strategy that will
12a⁄ect the other country through the exchange rate. For instance, a decrease in the
domestic money supply will cause the exchange rate to appreciate and then increase
in￿ ation in the foreign country.
Flexible exchange rate regime Substituting the foreign reaction function in
(22) into the domestic and vice versa, the equilibrium money supplies under the
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￿(￿2 + ￿￿ + ￿)
(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿
x (26)
As expected, both policymakers contract their money supplies following the sym-
metric shock and increase them according to the size of their employment target.
Comparing the outcomes in (26), it becomes clear that the ability of the two policy-
makers to react to the shock depends on their relative size. Proposition 1 formalizes
the relation between the size of an economy and its ability to respond to a given
shock.10
Proposition 1 In general, a relatively smaller open economy is capable of respond-
ing more aggressively against a shock than a relatively larger economy.
Proof. For the contraction of the small domestic economy in response to the
shock to be more aggressive than that of the foreign economy we need m < m￿; which
implies that ￿￿(￿2+￿￿+￿) < ￿￿(￿2+￿￿+￿). Substituting the expressions for ￿,
￿, ￿, and ￿ into this inequality and simplifying, we obtain the following expression:
￿(1￿￿)
￿ (￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) > 0. This unambiguously holds when ￿ > 1
2; that is, when the
domestic economy is smaller than the foreign one.
The intuitive explanation for the more aggressive response of the small economy
to the shock rests on its consumption patterns. A relatively smaller country con-
sumes more of the goods produced by the large economy; hence, the reduction of
in￿ ation induced by a contraction of its money supply, which causes the exchange
rate to appreciate, is larger. This e⁄ect is not that signi￿cant for the foreign economy
that only consumes a small proportion of goods produced by the domestic economy.
The policymaker in the large economy has fewer incentives to use monetary policy
strategically to stabilize his economy because his CPI in￿ ation depends less on the
exchange rate than in the small economy. Notice that as the size of the domestic
economy shrinks, its monetary policy decisions have a smaller impact on the foreign
economy (i.e. ￿ is reduced as ￿ increases). This decreases the incentives of the
foreign policymaker to react to the monetary contractions of the small country.
10The result that a small open economy possesses an enhanced ability to exploit the exchange
rate to stabilize itself better in the presence of symmetric shocks has been shown before by Giavazzi
and Giovannini (1998), Martin (1994, 1995), Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998) and Eichengreen and
Ghironi (2002), among others.



















































where N = (￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿
Employment, In￿ation and Losses. Substituting the above equilibrium money
supplies into the corresponding employment and in￿ ation reduced forms and then
the resulting expressions into the loss function of each authority, we obtain the equi-
librium policy outcomes presented in Table 1. The resulting equilibrium employment
outcomes are given by the monetary contractions engineered by policymakers in re-
sponse to the symmetric shock (i.e. n = m and n￿ = m￿). Hence, as a result of
Proposition 1, employment losses are larger in the small than in the large economy
after the symmetric shock takes place.
In the absence of time inconsistency problems (i.e. assuming k = k￿ = 0), the
small economy is capable of reducing in￿ ation by more than the large economy. The
intuitive explanation for this outcome rests also on Proposition 1. The small econ-
omy policymaker contracts his money supply more aggressively, shifting the in￿ ation
burden arising from the shock to the large economy and reducing its own in￿ ation
more e⁄ectively. Given these equilibrium outcomes, the ranking of employment,
in￿ ation and losses are formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Following the greater contraction of its money supply, the small
economy experiences a higher unemployment but lower in￿ation than the foreign
one. As a result, it is able to achieve better stabilization in the face of symmetric
shocks; ultimately su⁄ering lower losses than the large economy.
Proof. The fact that n < n￿ follows from Proposition 1. To show that q < q￿
need (￿2 + ￿) + ￿￿ < (￿2 + ￿) + ￿￿: Substituting ￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿; the inequality is
simpli￿ed to ￿(￿￿￿)+(￿
2￿￿
2) > 0; which clearly holds for ￿ > 1
2: Finally, to prove
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4) > 0; which unambiguously
holds for ￿ > 1
2:
To summarize, we observe that, following a symmetric shock, a small open econ-
omy that conducts its own monetary policy is better able to adjust the exchange
rate and achieve superior stabilization than a relatively larger economy.
Dollarization Using the reaction function presented above for the large economy
under the dollarization regime, the equilibrium money supply chosen by the foreign











where md￿ and md are the equilibrium money supplies under dollarization for the
foreign and domestic economies. As with the ￿ exible regime, the large economy
reduces the world money supply in response to the symmetric shock, x; and increases
it to accomplish its employment target, k￿.
The following proposition formally compares the equilibrium money supplies
experienced by a small open economy under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime and
under dollarization in the face of a symmetric shock.
Proposition 3 Following a symmetric shock, the world money supply reduction
engineered by the policymaker in the large leader economy under dollarization is
smaller than the optimal contraction chosen by the policymaker of a small open
economy that operates under a ￿exible exchange rate regime.
Proof. Cross-multiplying the two money supply expressions and assuming a
value of ￿ consistent with that of a small economy considered as good candidate
for dollarization (i.e. ￿ = 1), for m to be smaller than md; it is only necessary
to demonstrate that ￿￿(￿2 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿￿(￿(￿ + ￿) + ￿): This simpli￿es to
￿(1￿￿)￿=￿ < 0, a condition that unambiguously holds for positive expected values
of the structural parameters ￿; ￿ and ￿:
The reason for the smaller money supply contraction under dollarization is that
when the domestic economy lacks monetary policy, it does not export in￿ ation to
the foreign economy by tightening its own money supply. Therefore, the foreign
economy policymaker reacts only to the shock, without having to counteract the
actions of the domestic economy policymaker.
Employment, In￿ation and Losses. Since the contraction of the money supply
by the policymaker in the foreign economy is less aggressive under dollarization,
the small domestic economy bene￿ts from a smaller employment loss under this
regime than under the ￿ exible one. However, due to the smaller monetary con-
traction, equilibrium in￿ ation under dollarization is higher than under the ￿ exible
regime. Clearly, this outcome is inconsistent with the aim of a small economy that
relinquishes its monetary policy in order to achieve price stability.
As a result of higher in￿ ation, the losses for the small economy under dollar-
ization are ultimately larger than under a ￿ exible regime. The next proposition
15formalizes the ranking of employment, in￿ ation and losses under the two arrange-
ments following the symmetric shock.
Proposition 4 Following a symmetric shock, a small open economy su⁄ers less
unemployment under dollarization than under a ￿exible exchange rate regime. How-
ever, it experiences considerably higher in￿ation. The combination of these two out-
comes results in the small open economy enduring higher losses after the adoption
of the foreign currency.
Proof. The fact that n < nd follows from Proposition 3. To prove that q < qd
assume again that ￿ = 1: Then comparing the two resulting expressions we arrive
at a condition given by (￿2+￿)(￿ + ￿)￿ > 0; an identity that unambiguously holds
for positive expected values of the structural parameters ￿; ￿ and ￿:
By giving up its monetary policy, the domestic economy loses its ability to employ
the exchange rate for purposes of stabilization against shocks. For a small domestic
economy, dollarization results in a worse outcome than staying under a ￿ exible
exchange rate regime. This ￿nding contrasts with the Canzoneri and Gray (1985)
and Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) results for equal size economic where, in the
presence of symmetric shocks, a ￿xed exchange rate regime provides a Pareto e¢ cient
outcome with respect to the ￿ exible regime.
4.2.2 Asymmetric shock
The asymmetric shock is given by the demand shift parameter u > 0: This dis-
turbance generates in￿ ationary pressure in the domestic economy and de￿ ationary
pressure in the foreign economy (see (21)). Consequently, the domestic policymaker
has an incentive to contract his/her money supply in order to ￿ght in￿ ation, while
the foreign policymaker has an incentive to expand his/her money supply and stop
de￿ ation. In the case of asymmetric shocks, by following an independent monetary
policy, both economies generate a positive externality on each other. For instance,
when the domestic policymaker tightens his/her money supply, the real exchange
rate appreciates and decreases domestic in￿ ation. At the same time, that apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate helps the foreign economy to ￿ght de￿ ation.
Flexible exchange rate regime Combining the reaction functions described in
(22), following the asymmetric shock the equilibrium money supplies chosen by both
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u (28)
The asymmetric shock leads to a contraction of the money supply in the domestic
country and to an expansion in the foreign country. Just as with symmetric shocks,
16the reaction of the two policymakers to the asymmetric shock will depend on their
relative size. Indeed, Proposition 1 is also valid in the case of asymmetric shocks
(see Appendix A.2 for proof). Due to its smaller size, the reaction of the domes-
tic economy to the asymmetric shock is more aggressive than that of the foreign
economy.
Notice that, due to the nature of asymmetric shocks in our model, the burden
of the shift in the demand a⁄ects the small domestic economy more heavily. This is
because the domestic economy depends more on the consumption of foreign products
than does the large economy on products from the domestic economy. In fact, in
the case when the domestic economy is trivially small (i.e. ￿ = 1), the shift in
the demand has an insigni￿cant e⁄ect on the large economy. In such a scenario, the
foreign policymaker does not respond to the asymmetric shock at all and the burden
of the disturbance is only endured by the domestic economy.
Employment, In￿ation and Losses. Substituting the above money supplies in the
corresponding employment and in￿ ation reduced forms under the ￿ exible exchange
rate regime, we obtain the equilibrium policy outcomes and losses for the domestic
and foreign economy presented in Table 2. Due to its more aggressive reaction to
the asymmetric shock, the domestic employment loss is comparatively larger than
the employment gain in the foreign country (i.e. j n j> n￿).
As mentioned above, the asymmetric shock increases in￿ ation in the domestic
economy and causes de￿ ation in the foreign. In this case, the presence of the in￿ ation
bias intensi￿es the in￿ ationary pressure experienced by the domestic economy and
ameliorates the de￿ ationary pressure endured by the foreign country. Nevertheless,
even in the absence of the in￿ ation bias (i.e. under our assumption that k = k￿ =
0), the magnitude of the in￿ ation experienced by the small domestic economy is
actually larger than the de￿ ation su⁄ered by the large economy (i.e. j q j> q￿). The
explanation for this result lies in the nature of asymmetric shocks. As explained
above, due to the distribution of its consumption patterns, asymmetric shocks have
a more powerful impact on the small domestic economy.
The next proposition establishes the ranking of employment, in￿ ation and losses
for the two economies under ￿ exible regimes in the face of an asymmetric shock.
Proposition 5 Following the more aggressive reaction of the small open economy
to an asymmetric shock, its employment loss is greater than the foreign economy￿ s
employment gain. Meanwhile, the in￿ationary pressure experienced by the small
economy is actually larger than the de￿ation endured by the large economy. It follows
from the higher unemployment and in￿ation su⁄ered by the small economy that its
losses clearly exceed those experienced by the foreign economy.
Proof. The larger employment loss for the small economy relative to the em-
ployment gain of the large economy comes from its more aggressive reaction to
the shock established in Proposition 1. Meanwhile, for the in￿ ationary pressure
in the small domestic economy to be greater than the de￿ ationary pressure in the
foreign large economy, j q j> q￿ must hold. Contrasting these two expressions,




























































the inequality is satis￿ed when [￿(￿￿ + ￿)] > [￿(￿￿ + ￿)]: Simplifying that yields
(￿2 + ￿)(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) > 0; which unambiguously holds when ￿ > 1
2.
In this case, despite its enhanced ability to exploit the exchange rate to respond to
shocks, the nature of its consumption patterns prevents the small domestic economy
from achieving superior stabilization.
Dollarization Following the asymmetric shock, the equilibrium money supply











In the absence of a reaction from the domestic economy, the foreign policymaker
responds more aggressively to the de￿ ationary e⁄ects provoked by the asymmetric
shock. This response is, however, decreasing for ￿; the smaller the domestic economy,
the less is the reaction of the foreign country policymaker to the asymmetric shock.
In this expression, it is easy to notice that when the domestic economy is trivially
small (i.e. when ￿ = 1), the foreign economy is una⁄ected by the asymmetric shock
and as a result it does not respond to it at all.
Employment, In￿ation and Losses. Table 2 also reports the equilibrium levels of
in￿ ation, employment and output that result from the dollarization regime. In this
case, the foreign policymaker chooses a policy (i.e. a monetary expansion) that goes
in the opposite direction to what is optimal for the small open economy when it
conducts an independent monetary policy (i.e. a monetary contraction). After the
expansion of the world money supply, the domestic economy is able to increase its
employment level. However, it clearly su⁄ers a considerably larger level of in￿ ation
than under the ￿ exible regime.
When the domestic economy is trivially small (i.e. ￿ = 1), the foreign policy-
maker does not react at all to the asymmetric shock. However, devoid of monetary
18policy instruments, the small economy is incapable of responding to ameliorate in-
￿ ation provoked by the demand shift. The implications of the dollarization equilib-
rium on the losses experienced by a small economy are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 In the presence of asymmetric shocks a small dollarized economy
experiences an increase￿ rather than a fall￿ in employment but considerably higher
in￿ation than under a ￿exible regime. As a result, a small economy that adopts a
foreign currency as its own legal tender su⁄ers higher welfare losses than when it
maintains its monetary independence and allows its currency to ￿oat freely.
Proof. For a small open economy considered as a good candidate for dollariza-
tion (i.e. ￿ = 1), it is evident that the employment loss it su⁄ers operating under a
￿ exible regime is larger than the one it endures operating under dollarization. Now,
continuing with that assumption and cross-multiplying, in￿ ation under a ￿ exible
regime is smaller than under dollarization (q < qd) if 2￿
￿ < 2
￿(￿2 + ￿): Simplifying,
this only requires that 2
￿(￿ + ￿)2 > 0. On the other hand, following the same pro-
cedure, the small economy losses under a ￿ oating regime are smaller than under
dollarization (L < Ld) if (￿+￿)2 > 0: Both of these conditions unambiguously hold
for positive values of ￿ and ￿:
Once again, as in the case of symmetric shocks, its inability to employ the ex-
change rate for purposes of stabilization makes the small open economy worse o⁄.
In the next section, we combine the presence of shocks and the in￿ ation bias to
observe the properties of the regimes when both factors interact simultaneously.
4.3 Stabilization policies and the in￿ ation bias
In comparing the analytical solutions presented above, we have assumed that the
small and the large economies experience no credibility problems by making the
employment targets equal to zero (i.e. k = k￿ = 0): However, given that one of
the main aims of an economy that decides to dollarize is precisely to reduce its
credibility problems, at ￿rst sight this assumption might seem inadequate. Clearly,
the existence of a higher domestic in￿ ation bias increases the losses of the domestic
economy that conducts monetary policy under a ￿ oating regime.
In this section we assess the robustness of the analytical results presented above
by incorporating into the analysis the e⁄ect of the in￿ ation bias. Since the com-
parison of the equilibrium outcomes presented in Tables 1 and 2 is analytically
intractable in the presence of shocks and the in￿ ation bias interacting together, we
employ a numerical solution to observe how the losses su⁄ered by the small economy
change at di⁄erent levels of the in￿ ation bias.
For the numerical solution presented, the values of the structural parameters
employed are ￿ = 0:34, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 1 and k￿ = 0. Shocks are for
convenience normalized to unity. Structural parameters are not assigned arbitrarily;
they may be justi￿ed on the basis of empirical evidence or are set to re￿ ect the
environment faced by the policymakers. A value of ￿ = 0:34 implies that￿ from the
19original Cobb￿ Douglas production function where capital is constant and normalized
to unity￿ labour requires two-thirds of the total inputs. Empirical evidence suggests
that elasticity of the demand with respect to imports and exports are usually below
unity; hence, by employing a value of ￿ = 0:7 we intend to re￿ ect a high sensitivity
of trade to variations in the real exchange rate.11 Setting ￿ = 0:5 implies that the
central banks care more about in￿ ation than employment.12 For simplicity, we set
k￿ = 0; this suggests that the large foreign country, to which the small economy
anchors its monetary policy, has no credibility problems. Finally, considering that
the countries that have dollarized so far are signi￿cantly smaller than the economy
to which they have relinquished their monetary policy, we employ an initial value
of ￿ = 1 to re￿ ect the fact that the size of the domestic economy is negligible
in relation to that of the foreign economy. Acknowledging that the results in this
section apply to a reasonable set of parameter values but might not be valid for a
complete parameter space, we complement the assessment by presenting a sensitivity
analysis that examines the e⁄ect of changes in some of the key parameters of the
model.
4.3.1 Symmetric shocks
Figure 1 plots the losses for the small economy associated with di⁄erent values of
the employment target, k, under the ￿ exible (L) and dollarization regimes (Ld).
According to this parametrization of our model, only in the case where the policy-
maker in the small economy aims at excessive employment targets which seriously
compromise price stability, would dollarization be preferred to a ￿ exible exchange
rate regime. Despite the presence of the in￿ ation bias, the ability of the small econ-
omy to use its monetary policy prevents it from incurring large losses over the range
k < ￿.
Sensitivity analysis As mentioned above, the numerical solution presented ap-
plies to a reasonable set of parameter values but might not be valid for a complete
parameter space. Since variations in the parameters employed might have an e⁄ect
over the ranking of losses associated with the two regimes at di⁄erent employment
targets, in this section we brie￿ y observe how changes in the parameters that con-
stitute the domestic in￿ ation bias can a⁄ect the ranking presented in Figure 1.
We consider how a change in the size of the domestic economy, ￿, the elasticity
of the demand with respect to the real exchange rate, ￿; and the conservatism of the
central bank, ￿, in￿ uence the position of ￿ in Figure 1. Providing that the ranking of
11The Marshall￿ Lerner condition links the e⁄ectiveness of a monetary instrument with analysis
of the demands for home and foreign goods in the real sector. It suggests that sum of the absolute
values of the elasticities of home demand for foreign goods and foreign demand for home goods
must be greater than one for a depreciation of the exchange rate to have an e⁄ect on the trade
de￿cit and ultimately on output. Hence a value of ￿ = 0:7 clearly suggests that the Marshall￿ Lerner
condition is satis￿ed.
12Implicitly, in￿ ation deviation from its target receives a weight of one, which is twice the weight
assigned to the deviation of employment from its target in the loss function.
20Figure 1: Welfare Comparison Following a Symmetric Shock x > 0
losses for the small economy in the absence of an in￿ ation bias has been established
in Proposition 3, we simply need to consider how the in￿ ation bias in (15) changes
with the parameters of interest: ￿, ￿ and ￿. Di⁄erentiating the domestic in￿ ation




@￿ > 0 and
@q
@￿ > 0.
Notice that the ￿rst two parameters, ￿ and ￿; only a⁄ect the losses of the domes-
tic economy when it operates under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime (see equilibrium
in Table 1). As we observed in Section 3, the ￿rst derivative suggests that a com-
paratively larger domestic economy presents a higher in￿ ation bias. This increases
the losses of the domestic economy operating under a ￿ exible exchange rate vis-￿-
vis dollarization. Hence, a reduction in ￿ shifts the locus point, ￿, in Figure 1 to
the left. In other words, a relatively larger domestic economy would need to be
less ambitious in terms of its employment targets, k, to gain from operating under
a ￿ exible exchange rate regime. The intuition for this result comes from the fact
that a smaller ￿ results in a reduction of the domestic policymaker￿ s incentives to
a⁄ect the exchange rate (i.e. a reduction in ￿), an increase of the in￿ ation bias and
ultimately higher losses for the domestic economy.
The interpretation of the second derivative implies that a relatively higher sen-
sitivity of the demand to variations in the real exchange rate, ￿, ameliorates the
incentives of the domestic economy to a⁄ect the exchange rate, ￿; increases the
in￿ ation bias, and hence the losses associated with the ￿ exible regime at di⁄erent
values of k. Finally, a change in the conservatism of the central bank has an e⁄ect
on the losses associated with both regimes. In general, the losses under the two
exchange rate arrangements are reduced as the central bank becomes more conser-
vative. However, due to the presence of the in￿ ation bias, the impact of increases
in the conservatism of the central bank (i.e. a reduction of ￿) are more signi￿cant
for the losses associated with the ￿ exible regime. Overall, an increase of the conser-
vatism of the central bank shifts the locus point ￿ in Figure 1 (down and) to the
21Figure 2: Welfare Comparison Following an Asymmetric Shock u > 0
right. To summarize, a relatively larger economy, greater sensitivity of the demand
to changes in the real exchange rate and a less conservative central bank all increase
the losses associated with the ￿ exible exchange rate regime for a given employment
target k.
4.3.2 Asymmetric shocks
Using the same set of parameter values, we calculate the losses resulting from an
asymmetric shock at di⁄erent level of the in￿ ation bias. Figure 2 presents the graphs
of the losses experienced by the small domestic economy under the ￿ exible exchange
rate regime (L) and dollarization (Ld). It is clear that the losses endured by the
small domestic economy increase with the size of the in￿ ation bias (i.e. the size of
the employment target k) but never reach the level under dollarization. From the
perspective of a policymaker, this result suggests that the cost of the distortions
arising from an asymmetric shock in the absence of monetary policy is greater than
under independent monetary policymaking, albeit with poor discipline.
Sensitivity analysis Since in the case of asymmetric shocks the parameters ￿,
￿ and ￿ a⁄ect the welfare provided by the two regime in a non-linear fashion, we
tested the robustness of the ranking of losses in Figure 2 for ranges of parameter
values. Figures 3￿ 5 present the resulting changes in the equilibrium level of losses
at di⁄erent values of ￿, ￿ and ￿ for a given target of employment k = 0:5.
Figure 3 plots the losses experienced by the domestic economy under the two
regimes for all the possible parameters associated with ￿: The plot shows that, in
the presence of asymmetric shocks, not only is a small economy better o⁄ under a
￿ exible regime than under dollarization but actually an economy of any size could
perform better in terms of stabilization by keeping its own monetary policy.
Figure 4 presents the equilibrium level of losses when ￿ moves from its present
22Figure 3: Sensitivity of the Equilibrium Losses to Changes in ￿ for u > 0
Figure 4: Sensitivity of the Equilibrium Losses to Changes in ￿ for u > 0
value of 0:5 up to the point where the central bank cares equally for in￿ ation and
employment (i.e. ￿ = 1): It is clear that the gap between the losses decreases as the
central bank become less conservative. Nevertheless, the results remain in line with
the ranking presented in Figure 2. As long as the policymakers remain conservative
enough, the losses under dollarization exceed those under the ￿ exible regime.13
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the ranking of equilibrium losses for variations in ￿;
the sensitivity of the demand to changes in the real exchange rate: Consistently with
the previous two plots, this ￿gure shows no alteration in the ranking of losses for
values of ￿ < 1:
13A value of ￿ close to 2 (i.e. a central bank that cares twice as much for employment than
for in￿ ation) inverts the ranking of losses in Figure 4. Nevertheless, in our view, it is unrealistic
to think that modern independent central banks would care more about employment than about
in￿ ation.
23Figure 5: Sensitivity of the Equilibrium Losses to Changes in ￿ for u > 0
5 ￿Fear of ￿ oating￿and dollarization
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have suggested that although many countries, particu-
larly EMEs, o¢ cially classify themselves as free ￿ oaters, in reality a number of them
employ deliberate policy actions to stabilize their exchange rate against the e⁄ect
of shocks to their terms of trade. In this scenario, our conjectures about the supe-
rior stabilization performance of a small open economy operating under a ￿ exible
exchange rate become redundant.
Indeed, economies that employ their monetary policy instruments to prevent
exchange rate ￿ uctuations behave more as ￿xed exchange rate followers than as
free ￿ oaters. Presumably, in such situations the di⁄erence between giving up mon-
etary policy￿ by dollarizing the economy￿ and maintaining it, at least in terms of
stabilization, is only subtle.
In order to assess this claim, in this section we study the e⁄ects of ￿fear of ￿ oat-
ing￿on stabilization policies by drawing a parallel between fear of ￿ oating practices
and conducting monetary policy so as to ￿x the real exchange rate. We consider
the case of a small open economy which, despite retaining its own monetary policy,
attempts to minimize the variations of the real exchange rate with the aim of adopt-
ing the credibility of a larger economy which, for analytical simplicity, experiences
no credibility problems.14
5.1 De￿ning fear of ￿ oating
In order to make our de￿nition of fear of ￿ oating practices more realistic, we model
a de facto ￿xed ￿fear of ￿ oating￿regime di⁄erently to, for instance, Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991) or Jansen and Weng (1999) where, due to the symmetry in the
14That is, we assume that the foreign policymaker faces no time inconsistency problems (i.e.
k￿ = 0).
24size of the countries, a ￿xed regime implies the commitment of both policymakers.15
Considering that fear of ￿ oating practices are one-sided policies, we rather assume
that only the small domestic economy is committed to minimize the volatility of
the real exchange rate (i.e. to maintain the real exchange rate ￿xed) and that the
foreign economy takes as given the monetary policy decisions of the small economy.
Since the domestic economy maintains its own legal tender, the reduced forms
presented in the previous section for the ￿ exible exchange rate regime are in principle
the same as those for an economy that follows fear of ￿ oating practices.16 The
di⁄erence with respect to the ￿ oating regime is that the domestic policymaker adopts
a di⁄erent reaction function. In order to ameliorate his/her credibility problems, the
domestic policymaker tries to minimize the variations of the real exchange rate by






This reaction function implies that in the absence of asymmetric shocks the domestic
economy matches any change in the money supply of the foreign country with a
similar variation of its money supply, so as to keep the real exchange rate una⁄ected.
In the presence of an asymmetric shock, however, the domestic economy contracts
its monetary policy even further to stabilize the real exchange rate variations around
zero.
On the other hand, providing that the small domestic economy retains its mone-
tary sovereignty, the foreign country policymaker presents the same reaction function












In what follows we explore the e⁄ect of symmetric shocks over a small economy that
practices ￿fear of ￿ oating￿in conducting its monetary policy. Then, we compare
the equilibrium obtained with that resulting in the event that the small economy
relinquishes its monetary policy through dollarization.
5.2 Fear of ￿ oating equilibrium outcomes
In order to minimize the variations of the real exchange rate resulting from the
symmetric supply shock, the small domestic economy simply accommodates any
15In Canzoneri and Henderson￿ s (1991) ￿￿xed exchange rate leadership equilibrium￿ regime,
the foreign policymaker commits himself to deliver a particular money supply, and the domestic
policymaker commits him/herself to adjust his/her money supply so as to ￿x the nominal exchange
rate. In the presence of size asymmetries it is unrealistic to expect that a large economy will take
into account a small economy in deciding about its monetary policy.
16This assumption is consistent with the view that many economies let their exchange rate ￿ oat
freely in periods of tranquillity and only adopt fear of ￿ oating practices once the regime faces an
episode of distress (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005).
17This reaction function can be obtained from making the real exchange rate reduced form in
(10) equal to zero and solving it for m:
25Table 3: Dollarization and Fear of Floating Outcomes











change in m￿ by changing m accordingly (see equation (30)). Substituting the
reaction function of the domestic economy (30) for that of the foreign economy (31),







where mff and m￿ff are the equilibrium money supplies under fear of ￿ oating for the
domestic and foreign economies. As before, both policymakers reduce their respec-
tive money supplies following the presence of the symmetric shock. Substituting the
equilibrium money supplies in the corresponding employment and in￿ ation reduced
forms and then those two expressions into the loss function of each authority, we
obtain the equilibrium policy outcomes presented in Table 3 for the small domestic
economy that conducts its monetary policy under fear of ￿ oating.
5.3 Dollarization
The dollarization outcomes presented in Table 3 are taken from the previous section.
The only di⁄erence here is that, as mentioned above, we now assume a priori that
the foreign central bank experience no time inconsistency problems (i.e. k￿ = 0).








By comparing (32) and (33), it is straightforward to show that the contraction
under fear of ￿ oating is larger than under dollarization whenever (1 ￿ ￿) 0 ￿ <
1. This happens because, by responding with a similar reduction of its money
supply, the domestic economy that conducts monetary policy under ￿fear of ￿ oating￿
increases in￿ ation pressure on the foreign country. Consequently, the policymaker
of the foreign central bank counteracts by tightening his/her money supply more
aggressively.
The small economy equilibrium levels of employment, in￿ ation and losses corre-
sponding to the dollarization regime are also presented in Table 3. Given the larger
contraction of the money supply under fear of ￿ oating, it immediately follows that
the employment loss under this regime is larger than under dollarization. However,
due to this larger contraction, in￿ ation under fear of ￿ oating is lower than under
dollarization.
26Only when the domestic economy is trivially small with respect to the size of the
foreign economy (i.e. when ￿ = 1), is the equilibrium of employment and in￿ ation
the same under dollarization and fear of ￿ oating. Considering the combination of
employment and in￿ ation outcomes, the next proposition formalizes the ranking of
losses under the two regimes following the symmetric shock.
Proposition 7 As a result of fear of ￿oating, the small open economy endures a
larger employment loss than under dollarization but, at the same time, it experiences
lower in￿ation. The combination of these two outcomes results in the small open
economy experiencing higher losses after the adoption of a foreign currency whenever
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ < 1. Only when the domestic economy is trivially small (i.e. ￿ = 1),
are the equilibrium level of in￿ation, employment and losses the same under both
regimes.
Proof. To ￿nd that ￿nx < ￿nd; it is only necessary to cross-multiply both
expressions to ￿nd that this is true when ￿￿ > 0: To prove that qd > qx we also
cross-multiply to get that this is true when ￿
2 > 0: The same conclusion is obtained
when we compare the losses of the two regimes. For those two condition to be true
it is only necessary to be sure that ￿ > 0; which is always the case when ￿ < 1:
In terms of stabilization, there does not seem to be a major di⁄erence be-
tween conducting fear of ￿ oating practices and dollarization for trivially small open
economies. Nevertheless, as the size of the domestic economy becomes non-trivial,
then the ability to maintain monetary sovereignty, even if it is not fully exploited,
seems to matter for stabilization purposes. This happens because in our model a
non-trivially small open economy is capable of exerting some pressure on the deci-
sion that a large economy takes with respect to the management of its monetary
policy.
6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have shown that although dollarization might be an e⁄ective
regime to achieve price stability, giving up monetary independence might be costly
in terms of stabilization. We ￿nd that, in the presence of both symmetric and asym-
metric real shocks, a small open economy without time inconsistency problems is
capable of achieving superior stabilization under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime than
under dollarization. This contrasts with previous ￿ndings in the policy coordina-
tion literature for symmetric size economies which suggested that a ￿xed exchange
regime provides a Pareto e¢ cient outcome following a symmetric shock.
In the presence of time inconsistency problems we observe that, only when the
policymaker of the small economy faces serious credibility problems, does stabiliza-
tion following a symmetric shock become more costly under a ￿ exible regime than
under dollarization. For asymmetric shocks, we ￿nd that, regardless of the size of
the in￿ ation bias, the cost of giving up monetary independence under dollarization
exceeds that of the low discipline in controlling in￿ ation under the ￿ exible regime.
27These results suggest that a small open economy capable of imposing a reasonable
degree of discipline and of using its monetary polices e⁄ectively is always better o⁄
maintaining its monetary independence to confront economic disturbances. In our
view, these results are consistent with the demise of the dollarization debate at a time
when, due to the improvement of macroeconomic institutions and the benevolent
world macroeconomic environment, in￿ ation has settled down in most of the EMEs
that contemplated the possibility of dollarization in the late 1990s.
We have also compared the dollarization regime with one in which a small open
economy follows ￿ fear of ￿ oating￿practices. In this case, we observe that unless
its size is trivial, maintaining monetary policy sovereignty￿ even if it is not fully
exploited￿ allows a small economy to experience lower losses in terms of stabilization
against symmetric shocks. Only when an economy is negligibly small are the costs of
stabilization following fear of ￿ oating practices the same as those under dollarization.
With respect to the two-corner solution approach to exchange rate policy, our
analysis in this chapter does not intend to suggest that a ￿ oating corner solution is
optimal for a small economy but rather that￿ from a purely monetary perspective￿
it is preferable to the other corner solution, namely dollarization, in terms of macro-
economic stabilization. In fact, as has been pointed out by empirical evidence, pure
￿ exibility is hardly achievable by a small open economy with credibility problems.
Nevertheless, we have shown that even when a country is not able to fully exploit
its monetary independence, it might still be better o⁄maintaining the autonomy of
its economic policy than renouncing it.
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29Appendices
A1. Derivation of equations (1) and (2)
In each economy a representative competitive ￿rm faces a Cobb￿ Douglas pro-








The natural logarithm of this function is lnY = ln( 1
1￿￿)+(1￿￿)lnN ￿lnX: Sub-
tracting ln( 1
1￿￿) from lnY and using small letters to represent natural logarithms,
we obtain the aggregate supply equation in (1): y = (1 ￿ ￿)n ￿ x. Now, a pro￿t
maximizing ￿rm using the Cobb￿ Douglas production function presented above will














￿ W = 0 (A.3)
Rearranging and taking logs from this expression provides the pro￿t maximization
condition in (2): w ￿ p = ￿￿n ￿ x
A2. Proof of Proposition 1 for asymmetric shocks
In the absence of credibility problems, for the small open economy to respond
more aggressively to the asymmetric shock (i.e. j m j> m￿), it is necessary to show
that
j m = ￿




￿[￿(￿2 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿]
N
x (A.4)
which implies that ￿[￿(￿￿ + ￿)] > ￿[￿(￿￿ + ￿)]. Substituting the expressions for
￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿ the condition can be simpli￿ed to ￿(￿￿+￿)(￿￿￿)+￿(￿￿￿￿￿) > 0
with (￿ ￿ ￿) = 2





2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿
: Thus, it is
required only that ￿ > 1
2 for the inequality to hold. That is, the domestic economy
has to be smaller than the foreign one.
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